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ABSTRACT 
 
Although conflict in Zimbabwe’s diamond mining sector has recently received much international 
scrutiny, very little research has examined conflict in Zimbabwe’s gold mining sector. This article 
analyses how a nationwide crackdown called ‘Operation Chikorokoza Chapera’ (‘No More Illegal 
Mining’) affected – and ‘disciplined’ – livelihoods in profound ways in both licensed and 
unlicensed gold mining regions. Drawing on interviews conducted 2006-2013 with artisanal miners 
in the Insiza, Umzingwani and Kadoma areas as well as miners who crossed the border to 
Mozambique, the study reveals how a highly politicised crackdown led to uneven consequences. 
The analysis highlights both structural and physical violence, with more than 25,000 miners and 
traders arrested between 2006 and 2009 and more than 9,000 still imprisoned in 2013. Situating the 
crackdown within evolving political and economic interests, the study contributes to an 
understanding of how simplified discourses on ‘eradicating illegal mining’ mislead and mask 
power dynamics, while policing activities transform patterns of resource control. The study also 
emphasises that conceptualisations of the crackdown’s legacy should carefully consider the agency 
of artisanal miners’ associations, which, in some cases, have been actively seeking to resist 
coercive policies and rebuild livelihoods in the aftermath of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. 
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 ‘Operation Chikorokoza Chapera took the food away…Without gold there is no food.’ 
- Artisanal gold miner in Insiza District, May 4, 2009 
 
‘Many of the small-scale miners associations were completely disbanded during Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera…but some stayed together and the Zimbabwe Miners Federation has 
had to become stronger, to make our voices heard.’ 
 - Member of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation, Insiza District, December 9, 2012 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In many regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, the mining sector is expanding rapidly and 
attracting considerable attention as a source of political struggle and conflict. Ever since the 
discovery of diamond deposits in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands in 2006, a burgeoning body 
of scholarly literature has been examining the politics of conflict in the diamond mining 
sector in Zimbabwe (Nyota & Sibanda 2012; Towriss 2013; Nyamunda & Mukwambo 2012; 
Spiegel 2014). However, little research has been devoted to the socio-political dimensions of 
conflict in Zimbabwe’s gold mining sector, which provides livelihoods to a considerably 
larger number of people, with as many as two million people across the country deriving 
livelihoods from artisanal and small-scale gold mining (Shoko & Veiga 2004; Mawowa 
2013). The present article addresses this research gap by examining legacies of a violent 
period in Zimbabwe’s gold mining history when, between 2006 and 2009, the government 
conducted a nationwide crackdown called ‘Operation Chikorokoza Chapera’ (meaning ‘No 
More Illegal Mining’ in Shona). The operation, led by the Zimbabwe Republic Police with 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and other government agencies, was presented by state 
officials as an effort at bringing illegal mining under control, stopping smuggling and halting 
environmental degradation (Spiegel 2009). The article explores the questions: How did 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera affect livelihoods in artisanal gold mining communities? 
What are the long-lasting socio-political legacies of the crackdown? The study contributes to 
a growing body of scholarship addressing the policing of artisanal mining in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (e.g. Geenen 2012; Hilson & Yakovleva 2007; Duffy 2007; Maconachie 2013) while 
also responding to recent calls in the literature for more empirically rooted and historically 
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specific studies on the complex ramifications of state reconfigurations in rural Zimbabwe 
(Alexander & McGregor 2013). 
In broad scholarly accounts of resource politics in Africa, theories of ‘state failure’ 
have frequently been embraced to explain conflict and disorder in contexts where official 
state institutions have (or appear to have) limited relevance, in some cases modelling analyses 
around the much-cited work of Chabal and Daloz (1999) or Reno (1999). West African 
contexts of ‘weak states’ have often guided meta-theoretical analyses. However, with respect 
to contemporary struggles in Zimbabwe, Alexander and McGregor (2013) caution against 
oversimplifications in theorizing ‘that commonly assume [state] “weakness” and “disorder” 
and which diminish state institutions to a facade for “real” or “shadow” economies’ (p. 750). 
In understanding the politics surrounding elite actors’ accumulation strategies in Zimbabwe, 
they caution against downplaying the actual on-the-ground functioning and impacts of state 
power, where post-revolutionary discourses of empowerment have provided ideological 
justification by elites for heavy-handed state interventions that have a strong ‘disciplining’ 
character. Conceptualizing the experiences of a state crackdown involves complex dilemmas 
in Zimbabwe, where state power has been experienced in a myriad of complex and 
idiosyncratic ways. The study thus contributes to debates in wider African studies literature 
addressing political contexts where the ‘reach’ of the state has been extensive and where the 
indirect and direct effects of politicized state surveillance have emerged in diverse forms 
(Purdeková 2011; McGregor 2013). To address one particular arena of ‘experiencing the 
state’ in Zimbabwe, this study draws on interviews with artisanal gold miners and other 
people living in gold mining areas to ascertain how Operation Chikoroza Chapera impacted 
daily life, and it provides the first systematic study of the legacies of this operation.  
Fieldwork for the study involved in-depth interviews conducted between 2006 and 
2013 in gold mining regions in the districts of Insiza, Umzginwani and Kadoma as well as 
Bulawayo and Harare; it also involved participant observation work analysing the advocacies 
of artisanal and small-scale miners associations during this period, as well as interviews along 
the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border in gold mining sites in the Chimanimani highlands. 
Challenging the dominant government discourses on Operation Chikorokoza Chapera as a 
mechanism needed for ‘restoring order and sanity’, the study shows how the multifarious 
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consequences of the operation were at odds with its purported objectives, providing a vivid 
illustration of the consequences of a politically volatile policing apparatus that was 
increasingly engaging in violent displacement as part of a strategy of state rule (Hammar et 
al. 2010; Groves 2012). Mabhena (2012) and Kamete (2008) provide contextual analysis of 
the growth of artisanal gold mining as a livelihood strategy in different regions of Zimbabwe, 
and Mawowa (2013) examines political patronage in relation to mining, providing important 
contributions to an evolving debate on elite resource capture. However, the consequences of 
policing activities that emerged from Operation Chikorokoza Chapera have been 
significantly under-scrutinized by the research community. A parallel can be drawn between 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera and Operation Murambatsvina, a violent crackdown in 
urban slums and informal urban economies in 2005 that has received in-depth political and 
sociological analysis (Bratton & Masungure 2006; Potts 2006; Kamete 2012; Musoni 2010; 
Fontein 2009). Similarities can be seen in how both operations involved languages of 
‘modernisation’ to rationalise coercion, serving economic and political ends of the elite, with 
devastating effects on marginalised segments of society. Yet, as the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre observed, ‘Operation Chikorokoza Chapera attracted less international 
attention than Operation Murambatsvina, in part because what happened in the mining areas 
was less visible than what happened in the towns and cities’ (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, 2011). 
Bringing ‘visibility’ to the experiences of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera requires 
attention to the diverse locales in which gold mining was occurring and highly diverse people 
involved as artisanal miners. The fieldwork thus included visits to primary ore gold mining 
and milling locations as well as alluvial riverbed gold panning sites, and notably included 
interviews with artisanal miners at gold mining sites on a Canadian company’s mining claim 
in Kadoma, an Insiza District Member of Parliament’s mining claim, a riverbed gold mining 
site that was temporarily run by a Chinese mining company in a water catchment where 
Insiza District intersects with Umzingwani District, an Israeli-owned gold mill in Insiza, and 
two mills owned and run by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, among other places. The 
interview selection process involved strategic sampling and snowball sampling and formed 
part of a PhD dissertation that drew from interviews that took place over a seven year period 
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with more than 150 artisanal miners from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. In some 
cases, the artisanal miners were former subsistence farmers, while others had a long family 
history of gold mining; in some cases, interviewees were temporary artisanal miners who had 
recently entered the sector (e.g. former school teachers). Some interviewees identified as 
‘local’ to the area in which they mined, while other artisanal miners interviewed had travelled 
from afar. In some cases, artisanal miners who were interviewed in 2006 or 2007 were 
interviewed again in 2009, 2012 or 2013 to facilitate a longitudinal analysis. 
Working with artisanal and small-scale miners associations, the author was afforded 
access to a large number of gold mining sites and interviewees were often very willing and 
eager to share views and introduce the author to others. Nonetheless, there were significant 
challenges in the field research as the study took place during a period of significant 
economic hardship and political instability. Sensitivities relating to unlicensed mining 
activities were carefully respected and identities of informants have been anonymized. In 
addition to conducting interviews on-site in gold mining locations, interviews also took place 
at homes of artisanal miners, bars, vehicles and other locations. The validity and reliability of 
data was enhanced by triangulating fieldwork interview data with multiple sources, 
combining primary data sources with secondary sources and public domain documents (e.g. 
legal court proceedings relating to specific mines visited and parliamentary records). 
To contextualise the consequences of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, the first 
section below briefly discusses the government’s official rationales for the crackdown, which 
drew on economic and environmental discourses as well as ‘the need for order.’ The article 
then highlights how the crackdown resulted in physical violence as well as devastating effects 
on livelihoods. The analysis provides a micro-level descriptive account of policing artisanal 
and small-scale mining (ASM) in areas where no mining licenses were held as well as where 
ASM activities were informally occurring on sites where companies held mining and milling 
licenses. The consequences reveal the failure of the operation with respect to its own stated 
objectives. To appreciate the legacy of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, the article discusses 
not only the impacts that occurred at the time but also the highly contested long-term nature 
of imprisonment, with extensive incarceration persisting to 2013 for small-scale gold mining 
and trading-related offences that occurred as early as 2006. While these experiences highlight 
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punitive and repressive manifestations of state power, the analysis also situates the lasting 
impacts of the crackdown during the post-2009 era of a ‘Government of National Unity’ – 
made up of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-
PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – a temporary arrangement that 
created what Cheeseman & Tendi (2010) aptly call the ‘politics of continuity’ (p. 203). The 
analysis explores challenges faced by riverbed gold panners and primary ore small-scale 
miners (the former having been completely criminalised in 2006 and the latter only partially 
criminalised), emphasizing that the structural violence of the operation marked a turning 
point in rural relations that transformed patterns of resource control. 
The final part of the article’s analysis addresses the agency of marginalised groups 
affected by coercive state tactics. In analysing the impacts of Operation Murambatsvina on 
urban dwellers, Kamete (2010; 2012) argued that it is vital to understand the impact of 
coercive power in Zimbabwe in terms of its effects on the agency of displaced communities 
and their recovery strategies. His approach also calls for attention to ‘mutating practices that 
are no more than by-products of trial and error, always powered by the desire to defend 
threatened livelihood practices’ (Kamete 2010; 56). A nuanced understanding of agency is 
equally important when conceptualising Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. The article thus 
examines some of the advocacies of artisanal miners and mining association leaders that 
spoke on their behalf, particularly the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF), an umbrella 
organisation that represents 30 small-scale miners’ associations across the country.  
 
CONTEXTUALISING OPERATION CHIKOROKOZA CHAPERA AS THE 
ECONOMY PLUNGED 
 
Zimbabwe’s protracted economic crisis has been interpreted in a myriad of ways since 
2000 (Bond 2007; Bracking 2009; Chaumba et al. 2003) and, as Hammar (2008) argued, 
state-induced displacements (both urban and rural) have long been central to political 
strategies of state-making in Zimbabwe. Recent literature highlights the particularly volatile 
political atmosphere for managing the economy in the post-2005 hyperinflationary crisis 
period (Sachinkonye 2012; Rutherford 2012). The dramatically escalating inflation levels in 
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2006 and 2007 prompted the government to take drastic ‘reform’ measures that resulted in 
new forms of economic and social ‘disciplining’ (Jones 2010a; Jones 2010b). International 
critics of ZANU-PF widely asserted that the accelerated decline of Zimbabwe's economy 
might leave President Mugabe ‘without the cash to pay off those on whom his political 
survival will depend’ (Bremmer, 2007). Minerals – particularly gold and diamonds – were 
widely regarded as opportunities for corruption (Moore & Mawowa 2010). Meanwhile, 
scholars have recognized that theories of politicized resource control should not overshadow 
the increasingly important role that ASM – often with very rudimentary gold extraction 
practices – was playing as a survival strategy to marginalised segments of society (Mawowa 
2013; Tendai et al. 2012). In this sense, gold extraction emerged as an ever-more politically 
ambiguous sector, where informal livelihoods and elite actor’s interests sometimes co-exist 
but also compete, resonating in certain ways with observations elsewhere in Africa on the 
political character of ‘criminalised networks’ in the mineral extraction sector (e.g. Duffy, 
2007). 
The government’s longstanding requirement (under the Gold Trade Act of 1940) that 
all gold mined be sold to the Reserve Bank fuelled smuggling to unprecedented degrees in 
2006, as the prices for gold provided by the cash-strapped state were far less than could be 
obtained by selling through other means.1 As hyperinflation levels rose, the government’s 
effort to halt illegal gold mining and smuggling was portrayed as central to state security, and 
both the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the Criminal Investigations Department 
(CID) became increasingly engaged in policing the gold sector. As state institutions were 
being rapidly reconfigured to shore up economic and political resources for the ruling party, 
the Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, was empowered by President Mugabe to seize 
control of ministry functions across almost every ministry in the government (Sachikonye 
2012), and this included functions dealing with mining. In 2006, shortly before Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera was launched, statements by the Governor Gono alluded to small-scale 
gold miners, millers and traders as a rapidly growing threat to the nation. His language early 
in 2006 decried ‘the rampant illegal dealing in gold by small scale miners and custom 
millers’ – in a report entitled ‘Forms of Foreign Currency Leakages in the Economy’ (RBZ, 
2006) – creating the rhetorical justifications for a nationwide crackdown later that year. 
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As the environmental hazards of small-scale gold mining are well known – and a 
frequent point of focus in the scholarly community (Tunhuma et al. 2007; Zwane et al. 2006), 
these concerns were also invoked as a reason for the crackdown. In rationalising the complete 
criminalisation of riverbed alluvial gold panning, the Minister of Tourism and Environment, 
Mr. Nhema, commented: ‘As government, we have banned [gold] panning activities because 
we have collectively come to the conclusion that the environmental costs emanating from the 
panning activities far outweigh the benefits accruing to the panners’ (Xinhua, 2007). In the 
remaining part of the gold mining sector – primary ore (land-based) gold mining, 
opportunities to operate in the legal sphere were still theoretically available, but the 
imposition of new barriers to the acquisition of licenses, with the sudden introduction (in 
January 2007) of prohibitively costly licensing and Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirements2 (Spiegel 2009; Kanyenze et al. 2011) made it exceedingly difficult for poverty-
driven artisanal miners to operate legally. In rationalising coercive policies and policing 
during Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, some senior officials working in the Ministry of 
Mines in Harare envisioned the crackdown to be necessary as a way of setting the scene for 
the renewal of the sector and the transformation of ASM.3 In this sense, crackdowns were 
seen as ‘formalisation’ efforts that could be (ostensibly) rationalised on ‘development’ 
grounds. While the operation began as an initiative of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the 
Zimbabwe Republic Police to curb smuggling in the most active mining districts (including 
Insiza District) in December 2006, by early 2007 it morphed into a nation-wide policing 
initiative in which all types of primary ore gold miners – both licensed and unlicensed – were 
targeted.  
 
IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF THE CRACKDOWN 
 
Diverse Experiences of Policing: Immediate Impacts 
 
 Just as ‘state power creates, through its administrative and bureaucratic practices, a 
world of meanings’ (Mbembe 1992; 2), state power, as channeled through Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera, produced a world of diverse impacts. Interviewees highlighted 
multiple dimensions of the violence that ensued. One riverbed panner who had worked in 
Umzingwani River (near where Umzingwani River intersects with Insiza River) expressed 
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how he saw ‘hundreds of miners shackled overnight, without food or water.’4 A young miner 
at 20 years old, he also articulated his anxiety with these words: ‘My brother was arrested and 
I don’t think I can ever mine again. I don’t know what I’ll do.’5 In gold mining and milling 
sites in Insiza District, the word ‘ruthless’ was often used to describe police, and interviewees 
explained that groups of police circled miners and trapped them with no opportunity for 
escape. An artisanal miner who worked as part of a group without a license in Filabusi (the 
district capital of Insiza District, which was heavily dependent on gold mining6) described 
how police squads would form a horn shape so that miners were trapped: ‘The police tried to 
get us by surrounding us. They got some of us and some makorokozas [illegal miners] are 
languishing in jail.’ Another interviewee, a 31 year old gold panner whose account was 
similar, indicated that police for the operation were selected deliberately from out-of-town 
areas: ‘The police are not from Insiza District. They [police authorities] took the police from 
other provinces…This way the police are not sympathetic to us.’7 In both these accounts, 
interviewees described shootings, deaths, and drownings in rivers while trying to evade 
police. These occurrences also were acknowledged by some government officials when 
interviewed about the fallout.8 
Members of the Filabusi Miners Association emphasized that towns entirely 
dependent on gold mining were transformed in Insiza and Umzingwani Districts.9 The 
impacts of the crackdown, beginning in December of 2006, became more wide-ranging and 
severe in 2007 and 2008 as police presence increased in gold-rich areas. Both legal and 
informal small-scale gold miners across the country were shut down in 2007 by the Ministry 
of Environment, which cited non-compliance with environmental regulations as the rationale. 
Different kinds of violence thus became visible. On one hand, violence was associated with 
the cracking down itself, and some of the accounts in the interviews indicated that police 
activities involved stealing miners’ equipment, physically beating up miners with batons, 
occasional shootings and burning down huts in some cases.10 On the other hand, another form 
of violence emerged through preventing miners from engaging in gold mining, as livelihoods 
for men and women were extinguished and possibilities for earning were constrained. Where 
physical violence was not inflicted, the more silent violence of income deprivation took hold. 
Food stalls closed for business. In some cases, the closure of mining was believed to have led 
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to increased robberies and other crimes in what had formerly been mining-dependent 
communities.11 As expressed by one local government official in Insiza District who was also 
visibly frustrated with what was going on, some of the gold miners in the district were 
reduced to using very labour-intensive hand milling at night so as to evade the police, while 
others stopped mining and mineral processing activities altogether. Using the memorable 
image of music, the same government official noted that ‘the music stopped…the town life 
has shut down…The mining has been an essential part of my home town’s existence.’12 This 
insight resonated vividly with the findings of Mhiripiri (2013), whose analysis indicated that 
the music industry in Zimbabwe suffered considerably due to Operation Chikorokoza 
Chapera, as musicians had depended on makorokozas (artisanal miners) as audiences, and 
found that their support base was now ‘dispersed.’13  
As a gold digger and part-time ore transporter in Filabusi noted, when executing the 
crackdown, it mattered little to police whether miners had proper papers or not, stating,  
 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera was not only targeting illegal mineral buyers, but properly registered 
miners too. The arrests came and came. The law enforcement agents were oblivious of the proper 
documentation [certificates of registration, permits to transport ore, and log of gold sales, etc.] 
according to the Mines and Minerals Act.’14 
 
As one government interviewee acknowledged, reflecting on the Insiza area (which 
was known to some interviewees in Harare as a particularly violent example of where 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera impacted miners), ‘the police were out of control.’15 In 
contrast, some artisanal miners worked in licensed mining areas that were controlled by 
powerful companies and Zimbabwean war veterans who were politically well-connected – 
and did not experience the negative impacts of the operation to the same degree. For 
example, at Pansikwe Mine in Filabusi, certain ZANU-PF elites were able to continue mining 
and even take over other people’s mining sites amid the confusion. These tensions led to 
conflicts and legal court challenges by frustrated neighbours who sought to resist Pansikwe’s 
growing stranglehold on mining in the region.16 
At the same time, a ZMF member explained that in the Kadoma region, there were 
informal arrangements that had allowed some ASM workers to mine in companies’ 
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concessions, but, once Operation Chikorokoza Chapera began, those relationships began to 
fall apart and turn sour, and some miners interviewed spoke of intensified exploitation. Some 
companies that previously allowed ASM workers on their territory were suddenly blaming 
those same workers and rhetorically supporting the government’s police activities. According 
to the Chief Mining Commissioner, few mining companies in Zimbabwe had formalised 
agreements to allow artisanal miners to work on their land.17 Discussion with ZMF members 
suggested that, although the notion of tributing18 was supposed to apply whenever companies 
lease areas to miners, this rarely was implemented. Despite the existence of policies to 
formalise relationships between ASM groups and mining license holders, and despite policies 
to enable small-scale mining to be legitimised, these policies had limited relevance during 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. 
An example of a licensed mining operation (where artisanal miners were also 
working) that was significantly impacted by the crackdown was a gold mill near Esigodini, in 
Umzingwani, closed for a year and a half due to Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, according 
to the mill owner.19 The mill owner was still (in December 2012) recovering from Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera and conveyed painful recollections of when police officers and 
ZANU-PF youth came to the area with firearms and turned the area into what he termed a 
‘battleground site’ in 2007 and 2008. Artisanal and small-scale miners who brought ore to the 
mill were chased away by police and beaten up and shot at, according to his description.  In 
other cases in nearby mills, the crackdown had the effect of increasing the amount of bribe 
money that miners had to pay the police; other mill owners described how they would give 
police officers meals, cash and gold as bribe money, though poorer miners usually could not 
afford to make such bribes. 
Crackdowns also had the effect of shifting the geography of mining rather than 
stopping mining; for instance, crackdowns triggered a migration of some miners to the 
Chimanimani mountains, as found in interviews conducted on the Mozambique side of the 
Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. A discussion during interviews20 with two 21 year-old men 
on the Mozambique side of the border highlighted experiences of having to flee the Kadoma 
area – where they grew up and had worked as miners until the crackdown: 
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Question: ‘Were you able to mine in the Kadoma area?’ 
 
Miner 1: ‘Yes, but then Operation Chikorokoza Chapera made us stop and we had to move.’ 
 
Question: ‘Did you find it easier or harder mining when you came here [here at the 
Mozambique-Zimbabwe border]?’ 
 
Miner 1: ‘It is harder. You know, we had to leave our families behind.’ 
 
Question: ‘Are there police crackdowns here too?’ 
 
Miner 2: ‘The police are not affecting us here and we think it is ok.’ 
 
Dondeyne et al. (2009) and Ndunguru et al. (2006) documented some of the tensions 
surrounding gold mining in the Chimanimani mountains along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe 
border, discussing three regions on the Mozambique side with 1,050 Zimbabwean migrants 
working as artisanal gold miners.21 Operation Chikorokoza Chapera provides a sector-
specific context for conceptualising ‘how the processes and experiences of displacement have 
reconfigured Zimbabwean geographies, political economies and social forms’ as well as 
contributed to ‘processes of change within neighbouring countries’ (Hammar et al. 2010; 
264).  
Ultimately, while narratives of micro-politics are often contested, some facts have 
garnered widespread consensus. First, by April 2007, after just the first five months of the 
crackdown, police had arrested an estimated 25,000 small-scale miners across Zimbabwe.22 
Second, the crackdown forced many people out of their livelihoods – in some cases, creating 
fear in ways that motivated miners never to return to mining, while in other cases, creating an 
impossible-to-control mining environment as a result of cat-and-mouse relations with police. 
In some areas, police intimidation created a culture of rushed mining activity, leaving rivers 
more prone to environmental mismanagement and creating a scenario where mercury use was 
more precarious in the gold amalgamation process. Thirdly, in addition to the operation 
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failing to meet its purported environmental and economic objectives, small-scale miners 
argued that the policing activities produced far more ‘disorder’ than they suppressed, with 
multiple police CID units, military officials, CIO spies and ZANU-PF youth squads involved. 
Amid hyperinflationary gold pricing imbalances, bureaucratic delays in paying producers for 
gold output, institutional confusion and conflict, Zimbabwe’s official gold production 
declined from 11 tonnes in 2006 to just over 7 tonnes in 2007, the lowest level of output in 
over a hundred years (Zimbabwe Central Statistics Office, 2008). Fourthly, while the 
crackdown left the country’s national budget poorer as a result of expensive police work – 
spending a great deal on fuel, among other costs, it was well-known that certain businessmen 
became richer, profiting from the illegal gold trade. In the early period of the crackdown, 
allegations were publicly made by the Police Commissioner that elite politicians were 
benefiting from the unregulated gold rush.23 Later on, a wider spectrum of political elites 
were identified as profiting heavily as Operation Chikorokoza Chapera proceeded (including 
powerful Members of Parliament and Gideon Gono, Governor of the Reserve Bank). 
In some sense, a parallel exists with what Fontein (2009) described as ‘the 
contradictory experience of the apparently arbitrary application and often extreme, sometimes 
violent, execution of the operation’ in reference to Operation Murambatsvina. Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera highlighted the apparently ‘arbitrary state’ in producing profound 
uncertainty in mining areas; simultaneously, given the lucrative value of gold, the 
deployment of violence and the production of confusion served multifarious economic and 
political ends. The display of state power was such that one commentator concluded that the 
operation was not just about accumulating wealth but also about deliberately dispossessing 
others as a form of political disciplining: ‘Make no mistake, this loss of livelihood is not an 
incidental side-effect of the operation, but it is its very raison d’être’ (Sokwanele, 2007). 
 
Legacies of Operation Chikorokzoza Chapera as a Repressive Phenomenon  
 
The physical impact of the crackdown transformed countless gold mining areas – and 
beyond. Roadblocks were set up throughout the country to search private and public transport 
vehicles for minerals, and those suspected of illegality were arrested. As a member of the 
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ZMF noted, the intense and at times brutal crackdowns were clearly not proportional to the 
‘crime’ of unlicensed mining; the attacks on miners seemed to be routinely excessive, 
revealing a level of violence that defied a simplistic utilitarian logic of material/resource 
control.24 As part of a group discussion with ZMF members in April 2009, participants were 
asked to list five of the most important impacts of the crackdown for miners, and the 
following points emerged: (1) The police ruthlessly destroyed human dwellings, saying they 
were improper; this was despite the fact that the Mines and Minerals Act Section 175 states 
that a registered miner can have/erect temporary shelter. (2) The police confiscated gold (and 
sold the gold to Reserve Bank officials). (3) Mills were closed because they were said not to 
have Environmental Impact Assessment Certificates. (4) Tools were confiscated. (5) 
Claims/mills were closed because they were said not to have fences; this was despite the fact 
that the Mines and Minerals Act states that miners should fence the workings and not the 
whole 10 hectares. According to the Chief Executive Officer of the Zimbabwe Miners 
Federation, more than 25,000 registered small-scale miners were closed down in 2007.25 
The legacy of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera lasted well after its official end in 
2009, and artisanal and small-scale miners often spoke of miners still being in prison for legal 
infractions from as early as 2006. Table 1 provides the numbers of prisoners listed in the 
Magistrate Courts as being in prison in December 2012 for violation of the Mines and 
Minerals Act, Gold Trade Act and the Precious Stones Act. Consistent with what was 
reported above based on interviews with various artisanal and small-scale miners, a former 
prison guard interviewed that December explained that these numbers included those arrested 
for mining illegally as well as those arrested for trading gold illegally, while noting that gold 
miners were sometimes arrested simply for possessing gold without a license.26 Some miners 
were reportedly given five-year prison sentences for possessing small amounts of gold - even 
less than a gram, according to public reports.27 
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Table 1: Miners and Mineral Traders in Seven Prisons in December 2012 
Location of Prison Number of Prisoners Listed as Incarcerated for Enfractions under 
the Mines and Minerals Act, Gold Trade Act and Precious Stones Act 
Kwekwe 2,050 
Kadoma 889 
Mutare 1,739 
Hwange 350 
Masvingo 2,165 
Gweru 1,650 
Gwanda 3,000 
 
The Gwanda prison location listed in Table 1 covered mines around Filabusi and the 
gold mining regions visited in Insiza District. As interviewees in Insiza had emphasized, 
police were particularly unsympathetic there.28 The number of prisoners in Gwanda may be 
higher than other regions partly because there were large numbers of miners in this region 
and partly because of the nature of the policing. These policing and incarceration dynamics 
may be analogous in other districts, though the degree to which that is the case falls beyond 
the scope of this study. The point in including the numbers in Table 1 is not to suggest that 
these are the exact numbers of mining-related prisoners in Zimbabwe; in fact, the seven 
prisons listed here are not the only prisons in Zimbabwe. Rather, the point is that 
incarcerations were conditioning the discourses that small-scale miners used when speaking 
about the challenges that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera created. Small-scale miners were 
widely aware of the unprecedented scale of imprisonment in the mining sector.  
Importantly though, the ability to obtain the numbers listed in the above table is itself 
an illustration of the changing national political context for debating mining sector injustices 
in 2012 - as parliamentarians officially requested these numbers; in fact, the Zimbabwe 
Miners Federation had been given the official mandate from the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Mining to document the number of miners in prison. In this sense, Table 1 can 
be understood to be a reflection of the fragmentation within the institutional apparatuses of 
the government in dealing with the aftermath of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. Notably, 
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moderate ZANU-PF lawmaker Edward Chindori-Chininga served as head of the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and supported an enquiry into the numbers of 
artisanal miners in prison – at a time when various other ZANU-PF lawmakers were far less 
supportive. A week before he died in 2013, he released a scathing report of the Minister of 
Mines’ (Obert Mpofu’s) corruption (Chindori-Chininga, 2013). Chindori-Chingina’s death in 
June 2013 in a car accident was seen by the ZMF leaders to be a considerable blow to the 
cause of ASM sector empowerment. 
 
Legacies of Lost Rights and Post-Crackdown Rent-Seeking 
After policing activities started to subside, there were renewed attempts by small-
scale miners at gaining formal legal recognition in 2009, albeit often unsuccessfully. In 
interviewing primary ore gold miners at their mining locations in Insiza, Umzingwani and 
Kadoma, it was ascertained that small-scale miners often did not know how to register for 
mining claims or simply had no access to registration opportunities. These problems were 
exacerbated by the widespread lack of faith that proper registration procedures would be 
followed by mining licensing authorities. Many women and men involved in artisanal 
indicated clearly that they would like to become ‘legal’, even if it meant paying more taxes 
and fees, but they were not sure how or whether their finances could cover the actual (official 
and ‘unofficial’) costs of licenses.29 Furthermore, although national laws provided some 
degree of space for legalizing hard rock gold mining, the laws passed during the crackdown 
precluded Rural District Councils from being able to offer licenses for riverbed panning. The 
consequences of the lost right to pan for alluvial gold in riverbeds constitutes a particularly 
important and controversial legacy of the crackdown, as discussed below. 
Illustratively, in Insiza District, one interviewee (a small-scale miner with extensive 
experience in the district) reported that in July 2010 central government authorities (in the 
Ministry of Mines) had already taken steps to license a Russian company to conduct alluvial 
gold extraction in Insiza River.30 He suggested that this move would preclude the Insiza 
Rural District Council, which prior to the crackdown had been allowed to issue licenses for 
riverbed panning (Maponga and Ngorima 2003), from being able to submit plans to the 
central government for re-establishing the riverbed alluvial gold panning programmes for 
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indigenous workers. While the Russian company ultimately chose to mine in a different 
district, interviews during fieldwork with Rural District Council officers from Insiza and 
Umzingwane confirmed in 2012 that six Chinese mining companies had secured special 
grants from the Ministry of Mines (each requiring a 10,000 USD payment to the Mining 
Commissioner) for mechanized river mining.  
A senior member of the Umzingwani Rural District Council articulated frustrations 
when noting that ‘the Chinese are too big and connected to powerful people. They cannot be 
resisted, but we have received a computer and some cement for a school [from the Chinese 
company].’31 Admitting that this ‘contribution’ to the community was far too little, he was 
angry with the environmental destruction caused by the company. The Chinese company 
used large excavators and bulldozers - equipment that had not previously been utilized in this 
river – and concerns were raised that this negatively impacted the environment (as well as 
precluding local panners from panning for alluvial gold in the river). According to a member 
of the Filabusi Miners Association, both MDC-affiliated and ZANU-PF-affiliated Council 
Members in Insiza District were also angry about the Chinese company’s destructive 
activities in the river, a major water source in the area, and they were reportedly active in 
pressuring the company to leave in 2012. The monetary benefits of this type of ‘temporarily 
formalised’ river mining were also questioned, with miners noting and that it was unlikely 
that any taxes from the mine went to the government. 
The example above highlights just one specific site’s legacy from Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera – loss of local panners’ rights and greater environmental threats from a 
foreign well-connected business. The case here illustrates how the crackdown paved the way 
for new forms of accumulation by dispossession and political alliances that undermined the 
interests of local populations. More widely, artisanal and small-scale gold miners emphasized 
in 2012 that even though police crackdowns were not as common as they had been in 2009, 
government rent-seeking was an ongoing source of frustration. New licensing fees introduced 
in 2012 added substantial new barriers for small-scale miners operating in primary ore 
mining. The Ministry of Mines increased the cost of ordinary prospecting licenses (applicable 
to any small-scale miner) from USD 300 to USD 1,000 (ZMF leaders proposed a 
compromise price of USD 500). The Ministry of Mines also increased the price of permits to 
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transport ore (applicable to most primary ore small-scale miners or mine managers) from 
USD 20 to USD 1,000 dollars (ZMF leaders proposed a more marginal compromise at USD 
50). According to small-scale miners interviewed in December 2012, most small-scale miners 
could not afford the high costs for license fees. Some miners felt that they had to wait until 
the fees were lowered before officially resuming their mining operations. Milling centre costs 
had also been raised in 2012, with milling license fees raised from USD 2,000 to USD 8,000 
(millers also issued complaints to the Ministry of Mines). 
The notion that Operation Chikorokoza led to ‘lost rights’ needs to be understood in 
relation to a highly dynamic and fragmented political state, in which, as discussed by 
McGregor (2013) and Alexander (2013), official state power structures were shaped 
profoundly by evolving non-official power structures of ZANU-PF. While institutions in 
government that had not previously been responsible for mining (particularly the Reserve 
Bank) sought to control a number of gold mining sites, mining surveillance programmes that 
emerged from Operation Chikorokoza Chapera involved increasingly complex networks of 
ZANU-PF elites, police squads and Reserve Bank officials. In April 2009, a small-scale gold 
miner in Insiza District looked back at the changing dynamics of state intervention in the 
following way: 
 
The government has attacked the gold miners. They [government officials] say we have to organize 
and become licensed but it doesn’t matter if we are licensed or not. The police are invading our 
claims and, you know, there’s many problems with these guys [police]. The rivers are polluted yes, 
the environmental damage is there, but the people are hungry…and the police are arresting us and 
beating us up and taking our equipment. It doesn’t matter if we have all our correct papers [for 
mining licenses]…There used to be good programmes here to teach miners how to be responsible 
and the government guys were involved…Those days are history.32 
 
Three observations are noteworthy to help understand this interviewee’s perspective. 
First, his words reinforce a widely held view that gold mining had become an increasingly 
important economic coping strategy in Insiza District. This miner, as well as other gold 
miners and local government officers, estimated that most people in Insiza District depended 
directly on gold mining for income. One Rural District Council member estimated that more 
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than half of the population depended directly on gold mining. Secondly, the above miner’s 
words are also illustrative of the awareness that government authorities had previously been 
far more supportive. His language illustrates the relevance of situating contemporary political 
challenges in the context of drastically reconfigured state authority. Thirdly, the interviewee 
also alluded to the political nature of mineral resource access, whereby the acquisition of any 
mining licenses would have required paying large bribes to Ministry of Mines officials 
amounting to hundreds of U.S. dollars, even prior to government’s abandonment of the 
Zimbabwe dollar and the adoption of the U.S. dollar as an official currency in 2009. Such 
bribes were wholly separate from bribes to police. 
The interviewee’s account thus illustrates the need for distinguishing between what 
Sachikonye (2012) calls a ‘development state, which prioritizes economic and social 
development’ and a ‘predatory state, which consumes the surpluses of the economy as 
government offices become income generating sinecures’ (Sachiknoye 2012; 23). Although 
this dichotomy is never a tidy one and elements of both ‘development’ and ‘predatory’ state 
intervention can co-exist, Insiza’s gold mining sector was profoundly impacted by a shift 
towards predation and the increased deployment of violent state power, producing 
considerable fear among miners. Such problems also call attention to the lack of concrete 
support to match the rhetoric of ‘indigenization and empowerment’ in the mining sector, 
which had been paradoxically emerging as an increasing theme in government discourse at 
the same time that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera was in full swing (Chinaka 2007; 
Magure 2012; Murombo, 2010). Senior officials in ZANU-PF had pushed forward the 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 14 of 2007, asserting that ‘disadvantaged’ 
indigenous Zimbabweans would benefit from re-structured ownership of businesses under a 
new “empowerment’ agenda33, yet small-scale miners widely emphasized that the 
Indigenization and Empowerment Act was benefiting an elite group, not communities who 
were actually profoundly disempowered by Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. One small-
scale miner, in a meeting with miners and two government officials, emphasized that the 
‘idea to empower and indigenize in the mining sector is a good idea’ but that the 
implementation of the Indigenization and Empowerment Act was only ‘empowering only the 
big guys’34 – meaning the well-connected businessmen. 
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ADVOCACY STRUGGLES FOLLOWING OPERATION CHIKOROKOZA CHAPERA 
 
While the analysis above provides an overview of key impacts of Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera, the power to resist – or at least oppose – state repression has been a 
much-discussed theme with respect to previous state crackdowns in Zimbabwe. As Kamete 
(2012) points out while analysing Operation Murambatsvina, ‘a key shortcoming of 
modernist perspectives is their insistence on power being an exclusive possession of the 
dominant group (the authorities) which is deployed against the subordinate group’ (p. 72). 
This caution has similar relevance in the context of gold mining conflicts. While some small-
scale miners had alliances with powerful politicians, many small-scale miners were left to 
themselves to figure out a coping strategy. Miners were not passive, however. During the 
crackdowns, miners’ associations began actively voicing protest against these patterns of 
marginalization and criminalisation, taking it upon themselves, in some cases, to educate 
each other about how they might reclaim equipment that had been stolen by police. Group 
meetings were held amongst different miners’ associations to figure out how – if possible – 
they could resume work, how they could develop advocacy to create less unfavourable 
conditions for ASM and how they could be involved in processes of changing mining 
policies. As a member of the ZMF explained, ‘Many of the small-scale miners associations 
were completely disbanded during Chikorokoza Chapera…but some stayed together and 
ZMF has had to become stronger, to make our voices heard.’35  
When theorizing the impact of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera on the advocacy 
processes of artisanal and small-scale miners, it is important to recognize that the sector’s 
diversity meant that different groups had vastly different ways of coping with, or resisting, 
state policies. The ZMF invited miners and government officials to meetings that were often 
the scenes of contested and emotional debate. In some cases, ZMF advocacy processes led to 
small changes – such as a flexible time period for submission of EIA reports and payment of 
EIA fees. However, miners’ advocacy processes were not without controversy. Early in 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera’s implementation, the former President of the ZMF, George 
Kawonza, told newspapers that ‘We support fully the eradication of gold panning in this 
country but for legally licensed miners to be harassed in this manner is unacceptable’ 
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(Makoshori 2007), alluding to the harassment of miners by police forces. Such a statement 
might suggest that part of the crackdown’s ramifications was that miners were publicly 
turning against each other – ready to concede that the government was right to criminalise 
(and try to ‘eradicate’) gold panning (which is more rudimentary, more associated with 
polluting water resources, and frequently practiced by poorer miners) – while opposing the 
government’s handling of other types of more controllable and mechanized small-scale 
mining. More importantly, though, another consequence of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera 
was that it brought some miners together. Small-scale miners held meetings to confront 
problems emanating from the crackdown, voicing opposition to arrests and explicitly 
demanding that the government resuscitate support services for the ever-expanding small-
scale mining sector. The ZMF issued the following statement in a report to the Ministry of 
Mines and Mining Development in 2009: 
 
ASM does have the potential to economically empower disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and 
contribute to national poverty reduction efforts....On a local level, ASM can provide a means of 
survival and decent and productive work for the miners, generate new economic linkages, local 
investment and stimulate demand for locally produced goods and services and even some various 
types of basic types of basic social infrastructure (Zimbabwe Miners Federation, 2009, p. 2). 
 
The ZMF policy paper then continued to draw the case for national policy reform, 
noting that other ‘African regions do have Ministries for ASM or have departments within 
The Ministry of Mines directly responsible for small scale miners…Zimbabwe should also 
take a leaf from them’ (Zimbabwe Miners Federation, 2009, p 6). To help make the case that 
a new special unit for ASM should be developed within Ministry offices, the following was 
added: 
 
The Zimbabwean Government has put much emphasis on farming completely ignoring the [small-
scale] mining industry. Consequently there are multitudes of problems including abject poverty, 
lack of mining skills, no access to capital, hazardous working conditions, absence of organization, 
environmental devastation, non-traceability, illegality, harassment by customary and even state 
authorities. (Zimbabwe Miners Federation, 2009, p. 5) 
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The kind of language offered in the above report, although not particularly militant in 
tone, was not trivial; advocacy from miners helped to pressure state authorities to take a new 
approach, fuelled by the fact that small-scale miners represented a growing population and an 
exceedingly important political constituency. The quotation above perhaps slightly 
misrepresents the level of political interest and engagement – as government officials were 
often far from ‘ignoring’ the sector’s value. Nonetheless, in a post-crackdown mind-set, 
particularly as the prospect of future elections loomed, government leaders were well aware 
that they needed to show a softer approach than had been used in Operation Chikorokoza 
Chapera.36 Although the government did not take up the above recommendation to create a 
special ASM Ministry or departmental division, a surprising victory for certain ASM 
advocates was that – for at least a period of nine months in 2009 – a special office was given 
to the Zimbabwe Miners Federation within the main building of the Ministry of Mines – right 
next to the Chief Commissioner’s mining office in Harare. Communication increased 
between certain small-scale mining associations and government officials in some ways, due 
in large part to very active leaders of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation. Their task was 
complex as a new political space for dialogue was shifting nationally and interviews with 
them drew repeated attention to dilemmas over ‘how far’ to take the advocacy. 
Following the country’s violently disputed presidential election in 2008, a temporary 
alliance between the two main parties, ZANU-PF and MDC, in 2009, brought a contested 
degree of hope for renewed focus on livelihood-oriented policymaking in mining and across 
sectors.37 A detailed examination of the transition to the Government of National Unity in 
2009 is beyond the scope of this study, but there are key notable features of the expanding 
space for political dialogue inherent in the unity government’s composition that had 
implications for the mining sector. Hammar et al. (2010) aptly refer to this historical 
transition as a shift to a ‘marginally reopened political space’ (p. 264), where state power 
relations were only minimally reformed. While the ‘unity government’ formula was such that 
ZANU-PF still controlled the presidency as well as many of the most important ministries, 
including the Ministry of Mines (the notable exception is the Ministry of Finance, which was 
led by an MDC Minister), the unity government created a situation where deputy minister 
and minister were from opposing parties and where, according to government rhetoric from 
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both parties, renewed efforts at stakeholder participation in livelihood-oriented policymaking 
would be championed. In a significant breakthrough for small-scale miners associations, the 
ZMF hosted a multi-stakeholder workshop in April 2009, where the Minister of Mines 
(ZANU-PF), his deputy Minister (MDC), the Minister of Environment (ZANU-PF), his 
deputy Minister (MDC), and other Ministers participated in lively dialogue. Hosted in 
Harare, the meeting brought small-scale miners into the same room as politicians to voice 
their concerns, asking questions about injustices in gold sector licensing to issues of 
environmental management and beyond. Table 2 shows the range of issues on the meeting 
agenda (which included the legalisation of riverbed panning, although this was overshadowed 
by other agenda items relating to small-scale primary ore mining). As one interviewee 
remarked (immediately before the meeting), ‘This is the first meeting like this in many 
years…The government never used to allow a meeting like this.’38 What is particularly 
noteworthy about the meeting agenda (Table 2) is its highlighting of the multiple faces of 
state power that profoundly affected the lives and livelihoods of artisanal and small-scale 
miners – calling into question the practices of police units, environment authorities, mining 
license regulators, the Reserve Bank, and other arms of the state.  
 
Table 2: Agenda for Multi-Stakeholder Meeting on Small-Scale Mining 
 
Meeting Agenda – ZMF Small/Medium Scale Mining Conference: Issues and Concerns 
Stakeholder Meeting on Small-Scale Mining, Cresta Jameson Hotel, May 15, 2009 
 Mining mechanization and funding 
 Gold bullion funding 
 Gold Export Permit for ZMF 
 Indiscriminate arrests of miners trading in gold against the Monetary Policy     
        Statement on gold producers 
 The inconclusive Miners and Minerals Amendment Bill into Act 
 Granting of EPOs (Exclusive Prospective Orders) taking time to sign and the uplifting of reserved areas 
 EMA (Environmental Management Agency) charges which are quite inhibitive 
 Ban on the exportation of raw chrome 
 Great Dyke Monopoly by ZIMASCO, ZIMALLOYS, ZIMPLATS and UNKI (taking 95% of the 
mineralized area) 
 Diamond mining by small/medium scale miners. 
 The regularization of riverbed panners 
 The decline of mineral production 
 The potential of the small/medium scale miners of the turnaround of the economy 
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The meeting showcased only selected constituents. Some of the previous leaders of 
the ZMF were no long on the executive council – as they had campaigned for MDC positions 
in the 2008 elections and were removed from the federation for being too political. 
Nonetheless, the meeting brought participants together to discuss an array of contentious 
issues. The meeting highlighted how a shifting political space for public dialogue was 
generating new hopes and new ambiguities about the future for small-scale mining. The 
speeches showcased a range of institutional challenges and the need for trust-building 
following Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. 
In a mocking tone, the Minister of Mines, Minister Obert Mpofu, alluded to how 
‘small-scale miners never seem to get along’ and how – in a turn of phrase likely few people 
in the audience took as authentic, ‘small-scale miners should be more like me and my Deputy 
Minister, from MDC…We are from different political parties but we work together 
well…You small-scale miners need to stop fighting.’39 It was clear, however, that this 
statement was not read by audience members as genuine or convincing for at least a couple of 
reasons.40 First, opposition members were clearly not happy that they had been forced into a 
unity government with ZANU-PF, after having thought that MDC won the election; the 
relation between the leaders of the two parties, in particular, was profoundly tense. Secondly, 
the statement also was read as ironic in that the main problem in the small-scale mining 
sector was clearly not conflict between small-scale miners; rather, conflict between miners 
and government institutions (including police, mining authorities and environment 
authorities) was a far greater concern of the small-scale miners present at the meeting. 
Nonetheless, if a new and expanded political space for dialogue was indeed emerging, the 
presence of ministers at the meeting and their answers to miners’ questions were at least 
regarded as a welcome step. At other moments in the meeting, the Minister was confronted 
with questions about the bureaucratic and costly EIA process, the lack of funding for 
education of miners, the need for technology assistance, the indiscriminate arrests of miners 
and the need to ‘un-freeze’ prospecting licenses that the government had been holding in 
limbo.41 
Control over mineral resource access was again fiercely debated on February 14, 
2013, when a new association, the Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale for Sustainable 
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Mining Council, held a national stakeholder meeting to discuss the continued impacts of 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera and advocacies for reform. Two particular features 
underscored how memories of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera were shaping on-going 
debate. First, discourse and the politics of representation were central themes of dispute. As 
emphasized by one representative from the Association of Women in Rural Mining in 
Zimbabwe at the meeting, the term ‘makakorokoza’ – for ‘illegal miner’ – was derogatory 
and should no longer be used by the government. The discourse of ‘irresponsible’ miners was 
also contested in her speech as was the particularly negative effects that Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera had on women in mining communities.42 Notably, Murungu et al. 
(2012) provide a detailed discussion of how the government’s mining licensing efforts have 
marginalised women artisanal miners, with results of their survey suggesting that almost 50% 
of women in ASM communities had experienced being arrested by police in recent years. 
This provides a sharp contrast to the artisanal mining situation described in Ghana recently in 
this journal, where Hilson et al. (2013) argue that “numerous families have taken advantage 
of a low regulatory and police presence to undertake unlicensed small-scale gold mining and 
processing alongside their farming activities” (p. 122). A second key feature of the new 
association’s meeting was that a sense of solidarity was also being shaped and adapted. 
Artisanal and small-scale miners present at the meeting spoke out against repressive measures 
as well as the dominance of large-scale mining.43 There were, however, social divisions 
among miners’ organisations that had yet to be repaired, with diverse artisanal and small-
scale miners’ interests at stake. Unlike meetings in 2006 that had a strong presence of 
riverbed panners from the Zimbabwe Panners Association, the absence of riverbed panners at 
the February 2013 meeting indicated that panners were locked in a different kind of 
criminalised state and that the language of decriminalisation was less amenable to riverbed 
panning. Nonetheless, miners were making the case that Operation Chikorokoza Chapera 
should never be repeated and a new era of ASM support was urgently needed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Academic discourses on illegal mining in Africa often emphasize the need for 
policing and tight enforcement of environmental policies. How a government actually goes 
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about ‘formalising’ the gold mining economy is, however, intensely disputed. This article has 
examined how the conceptualisation of a police crackdown in Zimbabwe – allegedly a state 
initiative to formalise the mineral economy – requires careful attention both to immediate 
physical violence as well as long-term impacts on livelihoods. During the course of 
Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, tens of thousands of small-scale miners across the country 
were arrested, and miners encountered varied faces of violent and at-times seemingly 
‘arbitrary’ state power. Police stole miners’ equipment, destroyed dwellings and inflicted 
other forms of physical violence. In addition, there was structural violence associated with 
income deprivation, with rural economic coping strategies virtually shut down in regional 
cases where police were heavily active such as Insiza District. Far from the kind of ‘weak 
state’ apparatus described in much of the broader (often West African-focused) literature on 
artisanal mining, the analysis of this study underscores a complex inter-relationship between 
different arms of a powerful state and diverse artisanal miners who were affected by 
Operation Chikorkoza Chapera. 
Although some people profited from the illegal gold trade in conjunction with police 
corruption, the country’s national budget was left poorer as a result of expensive police work 
and less gold being collected by government gold-buying offices. Amid hyperinflation and 
ever-increasing technocratic hurdles such as costly licensing requirements, it was impossible 
for many artisanal miners to operate within the law. Kamete (2012) described how the 
violence of Operation Murambatsvina was made possible by technocratic ‘planning’ 
discourse that obscured the politics and consequences of coercive state policy. Similar 
technocratic discourses masked Operation Chikorokoza Chapera’s political and economic 
drivers. Moreover, just as Operation Murambatsvina resulted in multiple forms of 
displacement and marginalisation, Operation Chikorokoza Chapera produced multiple forms 
of displacement, not only driving ASM miners to resort to more rudimentary and clandestine 
forms of precarious mining in some cases, but also forcing some Zimbabwean gold miners to 
re-locate as far away as the Chimanimani mountains in Mozambique.  All the while, 
discourses of ‘order’ were used by senior government officials for diverse purposes, 
ultimately extending a long-standing pattern of what Hammar (2005) previously termed the 
‘growing normalisation of violence as a technology of rule’ (Hammar 2005; 3). 
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To conclude, while policing actions that emanated from Operation Chikorokoza 
Chapera deepened frustration with state repression and fuelled distrust between miners and 
regulatory officials, the crackdown also needs to be understood in terms of the agency of 
marginalised segments of mining populations. As state discourses of mining sector regulation 
continue to be debated, the present study has provided a glimpse into how artisanal and 
small-scale miners have been seeking to regain a footing in the aftermath of violent 
crackdowns. It is important to stress the heterogeneity of the ASM sector in Zimbabwe, as 
some – but certainly not all – small-scale mining associations have been working, or able to 
work, in tandem with politically powerful actors. While ‘state-induced displacements are not 
aberrations, but rather an ever-present possibility’ (Hammar 2008; 417), Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera’s legacy may ultimately be both the normalisation and contestation of 
mutating forms of repression via mining sector criminalisation. 
Three days before the 2013 presidential elections, ZANU-PF officials made public 
statements pledging to support and empower ASM communities, fully cognisant of their 
political importance as a voting constituency (Chingono 2013). In light of this populist 
rhetoric, it is all the more important to understand the legacies of Operation Chikorokoza 
Chapera. While certain constituencies within the ASM sector have managed to recover, 
artisanal gold panning remains criminalised and those small-scale primary ore miners who 
are less politically connected continue to face a future of marginalisation. As artisanal mining 
continues to be an important livelihood strategy in Zimbabwe’s ever-lasting economic and 
political crisis, more attention needs to be given to hidden dimensions of marginalisation and 
neglected voices in Zimbabwe’s dynamic gold mining communities. 
 
 
* This research was conducted with support from the Cambridge University Commonwealth Trust, 
the Trudeau Foundation and the University of Edinburgh. The author expresses gratitude to all the 
people who participated in interviews, particularly artisanal miners who generously shared their 
time and offered insights. The author also thanks the many academics who provided helpful 
comments on this work. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Due to hyperinflation, at certain points in 2006 and 2007 the government’s official gold price was the 
equivalent of one thirtieth of the international price when calculated at U.S. dollar values (Spiegel, 2009). 
2 The government’s requirement that all artisanal and small-scale miners submit environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) reports was interpreted in several ways by my interviewees. For some people, completing EIA 
reports (which required paying an environmental consultant upwards of 3,000 US Dollars) were regarded as an 
important step at identifying risks in the mining area – and several ecological risks associated with gold 
extraction are discussed by Tunhuma et al. (2007). However, as pointed out by Chimhowu et al. (2010), the EIA 
system in Zimbabwe was marred by political cronyism, with government officials often receiving money to 
complete EIA reports and additional fees for authorizing the EIAs in government offices. In my interviews with 
artisanal and small-scale miners, a common theme was that miners could not afford to contract consultants to 
complete the EIAs, and even where they could afford to do so, the reports had little impact on the actual 
environmental risk management strategies taken in the gold extraction process. 
3 Interview, senior official, Ministry of Mining and Mining Development, Harare, April 22, 2009. 
4 Interview, former artisanal riverbed gold panner (current part-time plumber), Filabusi, Insiza District, April 25, 
2009. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Famine Early Warning Systems Network, (2011). See also Constellation Consulting Group (2008). 
7 Interview, gold panner, Filabusi, Insiza District, May 5, 2009. 
8 One example was my interview with a ZANU-PF Council Member in the Insiza Rural District Council, 
Filabusi, April 24, 2009. 
9 Small-scale gold miner - tunnel digger and ore processing worker, Filabusi, Insiza, December 9, 2012. 
10 My interview findings here resonate with an analysis provided by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
which briefly described Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, noting that “the government destroyed the homes of 
thousands of informal miners, in many cases forcing the men to destroy their own homes while forcing the 
women to watch and sing songs of praise for the government” (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
2011). 
11 In 2007, a police officer who escorted me around some of the mines took me to the police station in Filabusi, 
where the numbers of arrests had been escalating. The increase in criminal activities as a result of Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera was also noted by members of the ZMF whom I interviewed in 2009, 2012 and 2013. 
12 Interview, Council Member in the Insiza Rural District Council, Filabusi, April 24, 2009. 
13 Mhiripiri (2013) discusses the example of a musician in Kwekwe, Tongai Moyo, who “lost a lot of revenue 
during this period because his support base of makorokoza was dispersed” (p. 22). 
14 Interview, small-scale gold miner (former riverbed panner), Filabusi, Insiza District, April 25, 2009. 
15 Interview, government geologist, Ministry of Mines, Harare, May 13, 2009. 
16 Legal documentation can be seen at: http://www.zimlii.org/files/zw/judgment/%5Btermalias-
raw%5D/2010/33/10_hb_033_1_pdf_13177.pdf 
17 Interview, Chief Mining Commissioner, Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, Harare, May 12, 2009. 
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18 The system of tributing in Zimbabwe involves a formal agreement between the mining license holder and the 
party or parties conducting the mining. 
19 Interview, gold mill owner, December 7, 2012, Umzingwani. 
20 Interview, Manica District, Mozambique, September 14, 2009. 
21 Ndunguru et al (2006) and Dondeyne et al (2009) document how police crackdowns on the Mozambique side 
of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border caused more problems than they solved, made environmental degradation 
and pollution worse and led to human rights abuses. There is widespread consensus amongst scholars that 
human rights problems have been more widespread and severe on the Zimbabwe side of the border, particularly 
as far greater numbers of people were arrested in Zimbabwe and more violent police tactics were utilized.  
22 Interview, senior official, Ministry of Mining, Harare, April 22, 2009. 
23 “Zimbabwe holds 16,000 over mining,” 28 December, 2006. BBC news. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6214431.stm (accessed 2 August, 2013)  
24 Interview, small-scale gold miner, Harare, April 22, 2009. 
25 Group discussion with members of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation, Harare, April 22, 2009. 
26 Interview, former prison guard and current prospective small-scale gold miner, Shamva, December 10, 2012. 
27 ‘5 years in prison for possessing half a gramme of gold worth $24: Gokwe magistrate,’ June 22, 2013. 
http://67.225.218.85/news/5730-5-years-in-prison-for-possessing-half-a-gramme-of-gold-worth-24-gokwe-
magistrate.html (accessed December 13, 2013). Notably, in parliamentary records, ZANU-PF politicians are 
quoted as emphasizing the need for increasing automatic jail sentences to an automatic 5 year penalty for illegal 
mining and illegal trade in gold and diamonds, despite vocal opposition from an MDC politician, David Coltart 
(now an MDC Senator), who was a lone dissenting voice at one of the meetings (Hansard, 2007). 
28 Interview with two small-scale gold miners, Insiza, December  9, 2012 
29 Interview, small-scale gold miner, Insiza, December  9, 2012 
30 Telephone interview, small-scale miner, July 12, 2010. 
31 Interview, Umzingwane Rural District Council Member, Esigodini, December 7, 2012. 
32 Interview, former artisanal riverbed gold panner (current part-time plumber), Filabusi, Insiza District, April 
25, 2009. 
33 Officially, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 14 of 2007 required businesses in Zimbabwe 
having a net asset value of over the prescribed threshold to have a controlling interest of not less than 51% held 
by indigenous Zimbabweans. This spanned multiple sectors including mining. 
34 Interview, small-scale miner, May 12, 2009, Harare. 
35 Interview, member of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation, Insiza, December 9, 2012.  
36 Analysts have noted that ZANU-PF started to shore up its political base by awarding mining licenses to 
potential supporters before the 2013 election campaign, as part of wider discussion on election strategy 
(Raftoupolous 2013). Legacies of Operation Chikorokoza Chapera can thus be understood within the context of 
shifting strategies of power-brokering and dynamic networks of patronage. 
37 Raftoupolous (2010) provides an in-depth account of the political compromises made in establishing the 
“Government of National Unity,” detailing how the unity government created some hope while also having the 
effect of silencing dissent on certain forms of violence. See also Kriger (2012). 
38 Interview, small-scale gold miner, Cresta Jameson Hotel, Harare, May 15, 2009. 
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39 Participant observation, multi-stakeholder meeting on small-scale mining issues, Cresta Jameson Hotel, 
Harare, May 15, 2009. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Participant observation, Harare, February 14, 2013. 
43 Small-scale miners at the meeting criticized policies that have given a monopoly on mining licenses in the 
Great Dyke to large companies such as ZIMASCO, ZIMALLOYS and ZIMPLATS. Small-scale miners argued 
that such policies have led to speculation activities and perpetuated the illegality of small-scale mining. 
 
 
 
 
 
